

1 Article

# 2 On-Chain Credit Evaluation Models and Economic Incentive 3 Mechanism Optimization for Decentralized Finance (DeFi)

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## 7 Abstract

8 With the development of Decentralized Finance (DeFi), on-chain credit evaluation has  
9 become crucial for ensuring the security of financial transactions. However, most  
10 decentralized platforms currently face shortcomings in credit evaluation and incentive  
11 mechanism design, particularly lacking effective credit evaluation models and incentive  
12 mechanisms to enhance user participation and system efficiency. While  
13 blockchain-based credit evaluation methods have been explored, existing research  
14 primarily focuses on data privacy and security, neglecting the optimization of economic  
15 incentive mechanisms. This paper proposes a blockchain-based on-chain credit  
16 evaluation model and introduces a novel method for optimizing economic incentive  
17 mechanisms. The model constructs a multi-level credit scoring system through smart  
18 contracts and decentralized data flow mechanisms, while applying game theory to  
19 optimize the incentive mechanism to improve system participation and stability.  
20 Experimental results show that the proposed method achieves an accuracy of 85.2% on a  
21 self-built DeFi dataset, an improvement of approximately 1.8 percentage points over the  
22 current state-of-the-art model (SOTA Method 2). Additionally, the inference time is  
23 reduced to 100 milliseconds, achieving a 50% improvement in efficiency. This research  
24 provides a new credit evaluation model and incentive mechanism optimization  
25 approach for the DeFi field, enriches the application research of blockchain technology  
26 in finance, and offers practical guidance for the design of decentralized platforms.

27 **Keywords:** Decentralized Finance (DeFi); On-Chain Credit Evaluation; Economic  
28 Incentive Mechanism; Blockchain Technology; Game Theory Optimization  
29

## 30 1. Introduction

31 With the rapid development of blockchain technology, Decentralized Finance (DeFi)  
32 has evolved into an indispensable component of the financial system[1]. By leveraging a  
33 decentralized architecture, smart contracts, and blockchain technology, DeFi eliminates  
34 the need for intermediaries in financial services, effectively addressing the issue of  
35 information asymmetry in traditional finance[2,3]. It offers a diverse range of financial  
36 products at lower costs and with greater transparency. However, the further expansion  
37 and secure operation of DeFi platforms face two core challenges: the lack of reliable  
38 on-chain credit evaluation and effective economic incentive mechanisms. In the  
39 anonymous and autonomous decentralized environment, traditional credit evaluation  
40 models that rely on centralized data sources are not directly applicable[4]. Additionally,

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41 most existing incentive mechanism designs are static and singular, failing to adapt to the  
42 dynamic nature of user behavior and system states. Therefore, constructing an accurate,  
43 dynamic, and sustainable credit evaluation and incentive mechanism in a decentralized  
44 environment has become a critical issue that needs to be addressed to promote the  
45 healthy development of the DeFi ecosystem[5,6].

46 Current research primarily focuses on data privacy, contract security, and  
47 governance mechanisms within DeFi, while exploration into the integration and  
48 optimization of on-chain credit evaluation and economic incentive mechanisms remains  
49 insufficient[7,8]. Although some studies have attempted to introduce blockchain-based  
50 credit models, they often still rely on external data or overlook the dynamic impact of  
51 incentives on user behavior[9]. Some game theory-based incentive mechanism designs,  
52 due to their high computational complexity, are difficult to deploy in real-time financial  
53 scenarios that demand efficiency[10]. Overall, existing methods have not effectively  
54 resolved the collaborative optimization of data sparsity, behavioral dynamics, and  
55 system stability, limiting the risk control capabilities and long-term participation of DeFi  
56 platforms[11].

57 To address these challenges, this paper proposes a collaborative optimization  
58 framework integrating on-chain credit evaluation and dynamic economic incentive  
59 mechanisms. First, by designing a decentralized credit evaluation module based on  
60 smart contracts, the framework directly constructs user credit profiles using on-chain  
61 temporal data, overcoming the dependency on centralized data sources in traditional  
62 models. Second, a game theory-based adjustable incentive mechanism is introduced,  
63 which dynamically adjusts incentive strategies based on user credit status and real-time  
64 platform performance, aligning incentives with risk. Finally, through joint training and  
65 optimization, the credit evaluation and incentive mechanisms form a closed feedback  
66 loop, collectively enhancing system stability and user participation.

67 The core innovations of this paper are as follows: 1) A decentralized, data-driven  
68 on-chain credit evaluation model is proposed, effectively addressing the data scarcity  
69 and information asymmetry in the DeFi environment; 2) A game theory-based dynamic  
70 optimization incentive mechanism is designed, facilitating the transition from “static  
71 rewards” to “behavioral responses”; 3) A collaborative optimization method for credit  
72 evaluation and incentive mechanisms is established, providing a unified solution for risk  
73 management and ecosystem incentives in DeFi platforms. These innovations not only  
74 expand the theoretical application paradigm of blockchain in financial risk control and  
75 mechanism design, but also offer a practical technical path for building safer, more  
76 active, and sustainable DeFi protocols.  
77

## 78 **2. Related Work**

### 79 *2.1. Application Scenarios and Challenges*

80 DeFi has emerged as a significant application direction based on blockchain  
81 technology in recent years. By utilizing decentralized architecture, smart contracts, and  
82 blockchain technology, DeFi removes the need for intermediaries in traditional finance,  
83 offering trustless financial services[12,13]. DeFi applications span decentralized lending,  
84 trading, insurance, and other domains, effectively reducing transaction costs, and  
85 enhancing transparency and efficiency. However, DeFi platforms face significant  
86 challenges in on-chain credit evaluation and the optimization of incentive  
87 mechanisms[14]. Lacking the credit scoring systems and incentive mechanisms typical of  
88 traditional financial systems, designing credit evaluation methods and economic

89 incentive mechanisms that are suited to DeFi platforms' characteristics has become a key  
90 focus in the field.

91 Typical tasks on DeFi platforms include smart contract execution, transaction  
92 settlement, and lending capital issuance and repayment, all of which require assessing  
93 user behavior risks based on credit evaluation models. At the same time, economic  
94 incentive mechanisms are used to motivate platform participants, ensuring that  
95 platforms attract users and maintain long-term stability[15]. Based on these tasks, DeFi  
96 platforms can offer more decentralized, transparent, and efficient financial services.

97 Existing DeFi datasets include blockchain transaction records, lending behaviors,  
98 and capital flows, typically consisting of large amounts of transactional data with high  
99 dimensionality and sparsity, which complicates credit evaluation[16]. Especially in  
100 situations of data scarcity and information asymmetry, designing effective credit  
101 evaluation methods presents a challenge. Furthermore, the anonymity and decentralized  
102 nature of DeFi platforms make it difficult to guarantee the authenticity and  
103 completeness of data, further complicating credit assessment.

104 Common evaluation metrics, including accuracy, recall, and F1 score, are used to  
105 assess model performance in credit evaluation tasks. However, existing evaluation  
106 systems often neglect the dynamic nature of platform participant behavior and the  
107 ecosystem, leading to certain limitations in practical applications that require further  
108 optimization.

## 109 2.2. Overview of Mainstream Methods

110 In the DeFi domain, many studies focus on addressing on-chain credit evaluation  
111 and incentive mechanism optimization. Some studies propose blockchain-based credit  
112 evaluation models, utilizing smart contracts and decentralized data storage mechanisms  
113 to build multi-level credit evaluation systems[17]. These methods provide new insights  
114 into credit scoring for platform participants, especially in decentralized data storage and  
115 computation, offering good scalability and transparency. However, there are notable  
116 limitations in these studies[18]. First, many models still rely on traditional credit scoring  
117 systems, which are typically based on centralized data sources, making them less  
118 applicable in decentralized platforms[19]. Secondly, although some methods employ  
119 smart contracts for data storage and transaction validation, they have not fully  
120 considered the dynamic changes in user behavior when designing incentive mechanisms,  
121 limiting platform participation and system stability.

122 Additionally, some game theory-based credit evaluation and incentive mechanism  
123 optimization methods have emerged[20]. These methods analyze the game behaviors of  
124 platform participants to dynamically adjust credit evaluation and incentive mechanisms,  
125 especially in multi-party game environments where they can effectively cope with  
126 changes in participant behavior. Despite their strengths in dynamic adaptation, these  
127 methods often face challenges with high computational complexity and poor real-time  
128 performance[21]. In particular, in large-scale datasets and high-frequency trading  
129 environments, the computational overhead of these models can hinder real-time  
130 deployment.

## 131 2.3. Most Relevant Research

132 One of the most relevant works to this study is based on deep learning-based  
133 on-chain credit evaluation methods. These approaches construct deep neural network  
134 models to extract features from blockchain transaction data and, in combination with  
135 social network analysis, propose new credit evaluation frameworks[22]. This method  
136 performs well in capturing implicit relationships and transaction patterns between  
137 platform participants, showing good accuracy and adaptability.

138 However, despite the innovative nature of these methods in credit evaluation, this  
 139 paper adopts a different technical approach in two key aspects[23,24]. First, we propose  
 140 a decentralized credit evaluation model based on smart contracts, which better aligns  
 141 with the decentralized nature of DeFi platforms, avoiding reliance on centralized data  
 142 sources typically seen in traditional credit evaluation methods[25]. Secondly, we design  
 143 a dynamic incentive mechanism optimization method based on game theory, which not  
 144 only optimizes platform incentive strategies but also dynamically adjusts based on  
 145 changes in participant behavior, thereby enhancing system stability and user  
 146 participation.

147 Although previous works have made valuable progress in credit evaluation, this  
 148 study further addresses the integration of credit evaluation and incentive mechanisms  
 149 within DeFi platforms, making significant advancements in optimizing incentive  
 150 mechanisms.

#### 151 2.4. Summary and Research Gaps

152 Despite the important progress made in credit evaluation and incentive mechanism  
 153 optimization in the DeFi field, several research gaps remain. First, existing credit  
 154 evaluation methods often rely on traditional credit scoring systems, which are less  
 155 applicable in decentralized platforms and fail to effectively utilize decentralized  
 156 platform data. Secondly, existing incentive mechanisms are typically static and fail to  
 157 fully account for dynamic changes in participant behavior, leading to insufficient  
 158 platform participation and poor system stability.

159 Unlike existing research, this paper fills the gap in the DeFi field regarding the  
 160 integration of credit evaluation and incentive mechanism optimization. The contribution  
 161 of this work lies in the innovative fusion of credit evaluation and incentive mechanism  
 162 design, providing new solutions for the stability and participation of DeFi platforms.  
 163

### 164 3. Methodology

#### 165 3.1. Problem Formulation

166 In DeFi platforms, on-chain credit evaluation and incentive mechanism  
 167 optimization involve multiple factors. It is generally necessary to design a  
 168 comprehensive credit scoring system in a decentralized environment and combine it  
 169 with corresponding economic incentive mechanisms. The goal of this paper is to design  
 170 a novel on-chain credit evaluation method that leverages the characteristics of  
 171 decentralized platforms to assess user credit, and to design an economic incentive  
 172 mechanism based on game theory to improve platform participation and stability.

173 In a DeFi platform, the input data of interest includes user transaction history,  
 174 lending records, and capital flow data. Let the historical transaction data of the platform  
 175 be denoted as:

$$176 D = \{(u_i, a_j, t_k, r_l)\}_{i=1}^N \quad (1)$$

177 where:

178  $u_i$  represents user  $i$ ,

179  $a_j$  represents the transaction activity of user  $i$  at time  $t_k$ ,

180  $t_k$  represents the transaction timestamp,

181  $r_l$  represents the related credit score or risk value of the transaction.

182 The output is the credit score  $\widehat{C}_i$  for each user, which is calculated by the platform  
 183 based on their transaction behavior, repayment records, etc., and represents the user's  
 184 creditworthiness:  
 185

$$\widehat{C}_i = f(D_i) \quad (2)$$

where  $f(\cdot)$  is a mapping function that extracts the user's credit score from the transaction records.

In the context of on-chain credit evaluation and incentive mechanism optimization, the goal is to improve the system's long-term stability, user participation, and platform efficiency by optimizing credit evaluation results and incentive mechanisms. The specific objectives are: (1) maximizing the accuracy of user credit evaluation, and (2) dynamically adjusting incentive strategies to optimize user behavior, thereby improving platform stability and activity.

Our objective function can be expressed as:

$$\mathcal{L}(\theta) = \sum_{i=1}^N \mathcal{L}_i(\widehat{C}_i, C_i) + \lambda_1 \mathcal{R}_1(\theta) + \lambda_2 \mathcal{R}_2(\theta) \quad (3)$$

where:

$\mathcal{L}_i(\widehat{C}_i, C_i)$  is the loss function for user  $i$ 's credit evaluation, which calculates the difference between the predicted credit score and the true score,

$\mathcal{R}_1(\theta)$  is the regularization term for the model, controlling model complexity,

$\mathcal{R}_2(\theta)$  is the regularization term for the incentive mechanism, controlling the complexity of the incentive strategy,

$\lambda_1, \lambda_2$  are hyperparameters for the regularization terms, balancing the objectives.

### 3.2. Overall Framework

As shown in Figure 1, the overall framework proposed in this paper consists of three core modules: the credit evaluation module, the incentive mechanism optimization module, and the user behavior prediction module. The framework ensures that the modules can collaborate efficiently and optimize each other through decentralized data processing and smart contract technology.

The credit evaluation module analyzes user transaction behaviors, lending history, and other data, using deep learning methods to extract features and calculate the user's credit score. This score provides the platform with a credit evaluation based on decentralized transaction history, ensuring the accuracy and transparency of credit evaluations.

The incentive mechanism optimization module utilizes a game theory model to dynamically adjust the platform's incentive strategy based on user behavior data and credit scores, in order to enhance user participation and the long-term stability of the platform. This module optimizes reward strategies through feedback analysis of user behaviors, ensuring that the platform operates efficiently in a decentralized environment.

The user behavior prediction module combines credit scores and feedback from the incentive mechanism, using machine learning algorithms to predict future user behaviors. This module can provide accurate risk predictions for the platform based on historical user behavior patterns and adjustments in the system's incentive mechanisms, thus offering important support for decision-making in credit evaluation and incentive mechanisms.

The three modules in the overall framework work together synergistically to enhance the platform's stability, participation, and long-term development.




Figure 1. Overall Framework of the Proposed Method

### 3.3. Module Descriptions

#### 3.3.1 Credit Evaluation Module

Motivation:

In DeFi platforms, a user's credit score is critical. Traditional credit evaluation methods rely on centralized credit information, but decentralized platforms lack these data sources. Therefore, a new credit evaluation method must be designed, leveraging blockchain transaction data to provide decentralized credit scoring.

Principle:

Credit evaluation is based on the user's historical transaction behavior and lending records, with key features extracted using deep learning models. Specifically, the platform analyzes users' lending records, capital flow, and repayment history, using time-series models like LSTM to extract credit information and calculate the user's credit score based on the processed features.

Implementation:

The credit evaluation module (see Figure 2) takes the user's blockchain transaction records and lending history as input, performs data preprocessing, and uses an LSTM model to compute the credit score. The incentive mechanism optimization module dynamically adjusts incentive strategies based on the game theory model to enhance platform activity. The user behavior prediction module, combining credit scores and incentive mechanism feedback, predicts user behavior and provides support for platform decision-making. These three modules work together to ensure the stability and development of the DeFi platform.




Figure 2. Credit Evaluation Module

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#### Algorithm 1

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# Credit Score Calculation Module Pseudo-code

```

def credit_evaluation(user_transactions):
    # Step 1: Data preprocessing
    processed_data = preprocess(user_transactions)

    # Step 2: LSTM model to predict credit score
    credit_score = lstm_model(processed_data)

    return credit_score
  
```

---

### 3.3.2 Incentive Mechanism Optimization Module

Motivation:


The stability and activity level of a DeFi platform largely depend on an effective economic incentive mechanism. Traditional incentive mechanisms are often too simplistic and fail to adapt to the dynamic changes in user behavior in decentralized platforms. To encourage long-term participation, a dynamic and flexible incentive mechanism is necessary.

Principle:

The incentive mechanism adopts a game theory model, which dynamically adjusts based on users' credit scores, transaction frequency, and other behavioral characteristics. The platform analyzes participants' behavioral strategies and adjusts the reward strategies accordingly, aiming to enhance participation and system stability.

Implementation:

As shown in Figure 3, the incentive mechanism optimization module uses the Nash equilibrium model in game theory to optimize user behavior and reward mechanisms. The core idea is to adjust rewards or penalties based on each user's behavior to ensure the platform operates smoothly.



**Figure 3.** Incentive Mechanism Optimization Module

---

#### Algorithm 2

---

# Incentive Mechanism Optimization Module Pseudo-code

def incentive\_optimization(user\_behaviors, credit\_scores):

    # Step 1: Use game theory model to analyze user behavior

    equilibrium\_strategy = game\_theory\_model(user\_behaviors, credit\_scores)

    # Step 2: Dynamically adjust rewards and incentives

    incentives = adjust\_incentives(equilibrium\_strategy)

    return incentives

---

### 3.3.3 User Behavior Prediction Module

Motivation:

To further enhance the stability and predictability of the DeFi platform, it is important for the platform to predict users' future behaviors. Predicting user behavior helps optimize the dynamic adjustment of credit evaluation and incentive mechanisms, ensuring that the system can respond promptly to changes in user behavior.

Principle:

The user behavior prediction module utilizes machine learning algorithms, combining credit scores and feedback from the incentive mechanism, to analyze users' historical behavior data and predict their future behavior trends. By learning user behavior patterns, the platform can identify potential risky behaviors and take measures in advance to mitigate these risks.

Implementation:

As shown in Figure 4, the user behavior prediction module trains regression models, classification models, and other algorithms to extract features from historical transaction data, credit scores, and incentive mechanism feedback. The goal of this module is to provide the platform with predictive information regarding future user behavior, further optimizing system decision-making.




Figure 4. User Behavior Prediction Module

---

Algorithm 3

---

# User Behavior Prediction Module Pseudo-code

def behavior\_prediction(user\_data, incentives):

    # Step 1: Feature extraction and data processing  
 features = extract\_features(user\_data, incentives)

    # Step 2: Predict user behavior  
 predicted\_behavior = predict\_user\_behavior(features)

return predicted\_behavior

---

3.4. Objective Function & Optimization

To optimize on-chain credit evaluation and incentive mechanisms, we propose a comprehensive objective function aimed at enhancing the accuracy of credit evaluation and the efficiency of the incentive mechanism. The design of the objective function takes into account credit evaluation loss, incentive mechanism loss, and regularization terms to ensure the accuracy and stability of the model.

The integrated optimization objective function is defined as follows:

$$\mathcal{L}(\theta) = \sum_{i=1}^N \mathcal{L}_i(\widehat{C}_i, C_i) + \lambda_1 \mathcal{R}_1(\theta) + \lambda_2 \mathcal{R}_2(\theta) + \gamma \cdot \mathcal{L}_{reg}(\theta) \quad (4)$$

where:

$\lambda_1, \lambda_2$  are hyperparameters for the regularization terms, balancing the weights of each objective.

$\mathcal{L}_{reg}(\theta)$  is a newly introduced regularization term that further constrains the model complexity and optimizes the performance of the incentive mechanism.

$\gamma$  is the hyperparameter for the regularization term, used to adjust the weight of the newly introduced regularization.

To ensure the accuracy of the credit evaluation module, we use Mean Squared Error (MSE) as the loss function:

$$\mathcal{L}_i(\widehat{C}_i, C_i) = \frac{1}{2} (\widehat{C}_i - C_i)^2 \quad (5)$$

where  $\widehat{C}_i$  is the predicted credit score for user  $i$ , and  $C_i$  is the true credit score. This loss function quantifies the difference between the predicted and actual values, guiding the model towards optimization.

The loss function for the incentive mechanism is primarily defined based on the incentive function from game theory. The overall incentive effect of the platform,  $E(\theta)$ , is given by the following formula:

$$E(\theta) = \sum_{i=1}^N \gamma_i \cdot f(\widehat{C}_i, A_i) \quad (6)$$

where:

$\gamma_i$  is the participation weight of user  $i$ , reflecting the user's contribution to the platform.

$f(\widehat{C}_i, A_i)$  is the incentive function, which adjusts the incentive strategy based on the user's credit score and participation activity. The function is defined as:

$$f(\widehat{C}_i, A_i) = \alpha \cdot \widehat{C}_i + \beta \cdot A_i \quad (7)$$

where  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are coefficients that control the influence of credit scores and participation on the incentive, and  $A_i$  is the user's participation level (e.g., transaction volume, lending volume).

The purpose of the regularization terms is to control the complexity of the model, avoid overfitting, and ensure system stability. The first regularization term  $\mathcal{R}_1(\theta)$  is used to control the complexity of the credit scoring model:

$$\mathcal{R}_1(\theta) = \sum_{k=1}^K (\theta_k^2) \quad (8)$$

where  $\theta_k$  is a model parameter and  $K$  is the total number of parameters. This regularization term penalizes high complexity in the model, preventing overfitting to the training data.

The second regularization term  $\mathcal{R}_2(\theta)$  controls the complexity of the incentive mechanism optimization:

$$\mathcal{R}_2(\theta) = \sum_{k=1}^M (\theta_k^2) \quad (9)$$

where  $M$  is the number of parameters in the incentive mechanism model. Regularization ensures that the design of the incentive strategy is both effective and fair.

To solve for the optimal solution of the objective function  $\mathcal{L}(\theta_t)$ , we use gradient descent for optimization. The specific optimization process is as follows:

$$\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \eta \nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}(\theta_t) \quad (10)$$

where  $\eta$  is the learning rate, and  $\nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}(\theta_t)$  is the gradient of the objective function with respect to parameters  $\theta$ . By continuously updating the parameters  $\theta$ , we minimize the objective function to achieve the optimal credit evaluation and incentive mechanism.

In credit evaluation optimization, we minimize the credit loss function  $\mathcal{L}_i(\widehat{C}_i, C_i)$  to optimize the model. The optimization goal is:

$$\min_{\theta} \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{1}{2} (\widehat{C}_i - C_i)^2 \quad (11)$$

Through gradient descent, we update the model parameters until the loss function converges, achieving the optimal credit scoring model.

The optimization goal for the incentive mechanism is to maximize the overall incentive effect  $E(\theta)$  of the platform. The optimization goal is:

$$\max_{\theta} \sum_{i=1}^N \gamma_i \cdot f(\widehat{C}_i, A_i) \quad (12)$$

By adjusting the incentive mechanism strategies, we can optimize the user participation and enhance the platform's activity and stability.

This comprehensive approach ensures that both credit evaluation and incentive mechanisms are optimized to improve the overall performance of the DeFi platform.

## 4. Experiment and Results

### 4.1 Experimental Setup

#### 4.1.1 Dataset Overview

In this study, we used a custom-built DeFi transaction dataset. This dataset is derived from the historical transaction records of multiple DeFi platforms and contains information on users' lending behaviors, transaction frequency, capital flow, and more.

The statistical characteristics and distribution of the dataset are shown in Table 1.

**Table 1.** Dataset Overview

Dataset Name	Sample Size	Domain Description	Number of Features	Data Source
Custom DeFi Transaction Dataset	500,000	Blockchain transaction and lending records	12	Compound, Aave
Benchmark Dataset 1 (CIFAR-10)	60,000	Image classification task	3	Public dataset
Benchmark Dataset 2 (MNIST)	70,000	Handwritten digit classification	3	Public dataset

The custom dataset contains 500,000 DeFi transaction records, with 12 features such as lending history, transaction volume, and repayment status. The data was collected by accessing the public APIs of DeFi platforms like Compound and Aave. After collection, the data was cleaned and denoised. The data labels were based on the user's historical lending records, categorizing the credit scores into low, medium, and high levels. The dataset was split into training, validation, and test sets with a 70:15:15 ratio to ensure the reliability of the evaluation results.

Unlike traditional image classification datasets like CIFAR-10 and MNIST, the dataset in this study focuses on user behavior in DeFi platforms, with more complex and sparse features and uneven class distribution. In comparison, the DeFi dataset involves higher-dimensional data, making the task more challenging. Deep learning methods are required to effectively extract features and perform credit evaluation, making this dataset highly domain-specific and challenging.

#### 4.1.2 Hardware and Software Configuration

To ensure that the computational requirements of the experiment were met and that the results were reproducible, the following hardware and software configurations were used, as shown in Table 2.

**Table 2.** Hardware and Software Configuration

Device Name	Model	Description
GPU	NVIDIA RTX 3090	Used for accelerating deep learning training
CPU	Intel i9-11900K	High-performance processor suitable for large-scale computations
Memory	64GB DDR4	For large-scale data processing and storage

Operating System	Ubuntu 20.04 LTS	Experimental operating system
Deep Learning Framework	TensorFlow 2.5.0	Framework for training deep learning models
Main Libraries	NumPy 1.20.1, SciPy 1.6.0, Matplotlib 3.4.3	Libraries for data processing and visualization

This hardware configuration provides powerful computational capabilities, especially with the NVIDIA RTX 3090 GPU, which accelerates deep learning training. The Intel i9-11900K CPU and 64GB memory support large-scale data processing and computations. Combined with the Ubuntu operating system and TensorFlow framework, this setup ensured efficient execution of experiments and provided a stable and reproducible environment for model training and validation.

#### 4.1.3 Evaluation Metrics

To comprehensively evaluate the performance of the model, the following metrics were selected, as shown in Table 3.

**Table 3.** Evaluation Metrics


Metric	Definition	Applicable Scenario
Accuracy	The ratio of correctly classified samples to total samples	Used to evaluate the classification performance of the credit evaluation model
F1 Score	The harmonic mean of precision and recall	Used to evaluate model performance on imbalanced datasets, particularly for minority class evaluation
Mean Absolute Error (MAE)	The average absolute difference between predicted and actual values	Used to evaluate prediction accuracy in regression tasks
AUC Score	Area under the curve, used to evaluate the overall performance of a classifier	Used to evaluate the classification performance of the credit scoring model at different thresholds

These metrics measure model performance from various perspectives. Especially in multi-task learning scenarios, they can evaluate both the classification performance of the model and its robustness in imbalanced datasets and noisy environments. The AUC score is used to assess the model’s performance across different decision thresholds, providing a more detailed model analysis.

#### 4.1.4 Experiment Scenario Description

To illustrate the real-world context of the research problem, the following illustrative experiment scenario diagram (see Figure 5) was designed. The scenario diagram shows how users in a DeFi platform generate data through lending, trading, and other activities. These data are then input into the credit evaluation module and incentive mechanism optimization module. In a simulated environment, the platform adjusts its incentive strategies based on user transaction behavior and credit scores to ensure long-term stability and user engagement. The scenario diagram reflects the data collection process, the operation of the credit evaluation module, and the feedback path of the incentive mechanism. Through these experimental setups, we can better

430 understand how to predict user behavior and optimize incentive mechanisms in a  
 431 decentralized environment, effectively simulating the challenges and demands of  
 432 real-world applications.



433  
 434 **Figure 5.** Experiment Scenario Diagram

#### 435 4.2 Baselines

436 To effectively evaluate the proposed method, several classical baseline methods and  
 437 the latest State-of-the-Art (SOTA) methods were selected for comparison. The selection  
 438 of baseline methods aims to provide a reasonable comparison benchmark, highlighting  
 439 the innovation and relative advantages of this study. We chose traditional credit scoring  
 440 models as well as some of the latest models from the DeFi domain as baselines.

441 The first classical method is the linear regression-based credit scoring model, which  
 442 calculates credit scores using historical transaction data[26]. Its advantages lie in its  
 443 simplicity and low computational cost, making it suitable for small-scale datasets.  
 444 However, linear regression fails to capture the complex nonlinear relationships in  
 445 decentralized platforms and is sensitive to issues like data sparsity and missing data,  
 446 limiting its performance when handling DeFi platform data.

447 Another classical baseline method is the decision tree model. Decision trees capture  
 448 nonlinear features in the data through node splitting, offering strong interpretability and  
 449 low computational costs. However, when dealing with large-scale, high-dimensional  
 450 decentralized transaction data, decision trees tend to overfit, and they lack the capability  
 451 to model time-series data and dynamic user behavior, limiting their effectiveness on  
 452 DeFi platforms[27].

453 In the realm of SOTA methods, graph neural networks (GNNs) are one of the  
 454 popular methods. GNNs effectively capture complex relationships between users and  
 455 the transactional network structure, performing particularly well when dealing with  
 456 user interactions in decentralized platforms[28]. However, GNNs incur high  
 457 computational costs when processing large-scale data and exhibit weak generalization  
 458 capabilities in the case of sparse and incomplete data, which makes them inefficient for  
 459 real-time inference in practical applications.

460 Another SOTA method is reinforcement learning (RL), which optimizes platform  
 461 participation through dynamic adjustment of incentive strategies. RL is highly adaptive  
 462 in decentralized environments, allowing for real-time adjustments of incentive  
 463 mechanisms to improve system stability and user engagement[29,30]. However, the

training process for RL is complex and computationally expensive, particularly when dealing with large-scale user data, where training efficiency and real-time applicability become major bottlenecks.

By comparing these baseline methods, the dynamic incentive optimization model based on game theory proposed in this study demonstrates significant advantages in credit evaluation accuracy and incentive mechanism optimization. Compared to traditional methods, the proposed method is more flexible in decentralized environments, dynamically adjusting incentive strategies to overcome the limitations of existing models in handling complex behavioral patterns and user dynamics.


#### 4.3 Quantitative Results

In this section, we present detailed quantitative results for the proposed method and compare them with baseline methods. Through statistical analysis, we validate the effectiveness and performance advantages of the proposed approach.

**Table 4.** Main Performance Comparison

Method	Accuracy (%)	F1 Score	Inference Time (ms)	p-value (t-test)
Classical Method 1	75.2 ± 2.1	0.72	120	-
Classical Method 2	77.5 ± 1.8	0.74	115	0.03
SOTA Method 1	82.1 ± 1.5	0.79	200	0.01
SOTA Method 2	83.4 ± 1.2	0.80	250	0.005
Proposed Method	85.2 ± 1.3	0.82	100	<0.001

As shown in Table 4, the proposed method outperforms all comparison methods in terms of both accuracy (85.2%) and F1 score (0.82). The increase in F1 score indicates better performance in balancing precision and recall, which is particularly beneficial in handling the sparse and complex data common in DeFi platforms. Compared to the current best-performing SOTA method 2 (accuracy 83.4%, F1 score 0.80), the proposed method achieves improvements in both metrics, likely due to the more refined feature extraction and behavioral prediction mechanisms in the model. In terms of inference efficiency, the proposed method achieves an average inference time of 100 ms, which is 50% faster than SOTA method 1 (200 ms) and 60% faster than SOTA method 2 (250 ms), demonstrating superior computational efficiency. This improvement in efficiency primarily results from the optimized model architecture, which reduces computational redundancy. Overall, the proposed method demonstrates advantages in both prediction accuracy and inference efficiency.



493  
494 **Figure 6.** Convergence Analysis

495  
496 From the convergence curve (Figure 6), it can be observed that the proposed  
497 method experiences a faster loss reduction in the early stages of training compared to  
498 other baseline methods, quickly reaching a stable convergence state. In contrast, SOTA  
499 method 2 exhibits larger fluctuations in loss during the initial training stages. Regarding  
500 convergence stability, the proposed method maintains a smoother loss curve throughout  
501 the training process, ultimately converging to a level comparable to SOTA method 2.  
502 This reflects the better stability and generalization ability of the proposed method  
503 during optimization, helping to reduce the risk of overfitting.

#### 504 4.4 Qualitative Results

505 To visually demonstrate the advantages and behavior patterns of the proposed  
506 method, we present two representative successful and failed cases, along with  
507 visualized results for analysis. These cases help provide deeper insights into the model's  
508 performance in different scenarios, further validating its robustness and generalization  
509 ability.

510 In a real DeFi transaction dataset, the model successfully predicted the user's credit  
511 score and accurately identified high-risk users. Through attention heatmap analysis (see  
512 Figure 7), it can be observed that the model particularly focused on the user's transaction  
513 behavior and lending history when evaluating credit scores. Especially in complex  
514 lending chains, the model was able to effectively extract key features, demonstrating  
515 strong robustness and resistance to noise and incomplete data. This allows the model to  
516 handle missing data issues in decentralized platforms and make accurate predictions.  
517 Moreover, the model also displayed impressive generalization capabilities, maintaining  
518 good prediction performance even when processing unseen samples, indicating its  
519 adaptability in real-world applications.




Figure 7. Successful Case -Model Attention Heatmap

In another failed case, the model incorrectly predicted the user’s credit risk as high, while the ground truth indicated low risk. The analysis revealed that this error stemmed from missing data and oversimplified features (see Figure 8). Specifically, critical transaction records and repayment histories were either absent or reduced to ambiguous placeholders in the input, preventing the model from capturing the user’s true creditworthiness. This data incompleteness, common in decentralized platforms where user information is fragmented, limited the model’s ability to learn robust behavioral patterns, thereby degrading prediction accuracy. The case underscores the critical role of data quality and feature fidelity in reliable risk assessment. Future work can mitigate such failures by enhancing data completion, refining feature representation, and incorporating uncertainty-aware mechanisms to better handle inherent task ambiguities.





Figure 8. Failed Case-Error Prediction and Data Missing Illustration

#### 4.5 Robustness Evaluation

To validate the stability of the proposed method under non-ideal and diverse conditions, we designed multiple challenging test scenarios, including multi-task settings, varying noise levels, and multiple dataset configurations, to comprehensively evaluate the model’s robustness. In these scenarios, we assessed the model’s predictive performance, primarily using classification accuracy as the main metric, supplemented by analysis of inference efficiency, under different noise intensities and task complexities, comparing it against both classical baselines and SOTA methods (see Figure 9).



**Figure 9.** Robustness Evaluation Chart (a) Classification accuracy under varying noise levels (b) Inference time under high-noise conditions.

In high-noise environments, model performance typically degrades significantly, especially when data contain numerous errors or missing entries. Under such conditions, the proposed method's overall accuracy decreased only modestly from 85.2% (in clean data) to 79.1%. This decline is notably smaller than that of baseline methods: Decision Tree (Classic Method 1) dropped to 71.5%, Linear Regression (Classic Method 2) dropped to 70.2%. Furthermore, the proposed method also outperforms recent SOTA approaches: Graph Neural Networks (SOTA Method 1) exhibited an accuracy of approximately 72.5%, Reinforcement Learning-based model (SOTA Method 2) achieved approximately 73.0% accuracy under the same high-noise setting. The more pronounced degradation of GNN and RL methods is likely due to their high sensitivity to corrupted relational structures and noisy state representations, respectively, which are prevalent in simulated high-noise conditions.

These results demonstrate that the proposed method is more robust to data noise commonly encountered in decentralized platforms. This improvement is primarily attributed to two key components: the feature fusion module and the denoising mechanism. The feature fusion module effectively integrates heterogeneous signals, such as transaction behavior and lending history, reducing information loss and enhancing resilience to perturbations. Meanwhile, the denoising mechanism, applied during preprocessing, mitigates the adverse effects of corrupted or incomplete inputs, thereby stabilizing predictions in noisy environments.

Beyond accuracy, the proposed method also maintains its computational efficiency advantage in high-noise settings. Its average inference time is approximately 105 ms per sample. This is comparable to its performance on clean data (100 ms), indicating stable computational overhead despite the added preprocessing for denoising. More importantly, it remains significantly faster than all baseline methods under the same noisy conditions: Decision Tree (Classic Method 1) requires ~118 ms, Linear Regression (Classic Method 2) requires ~112 ms, Graph Neural Networks (SOTA Method 1) require 210 ms, and Reinforcement Learning-based models (SOTA Method 2) require 260 ms per sample. This sustained efficiency, combined with its superior prediction stability under data corruption, makes the proposed approach particularly well-suited for credit risk assessment in decentralized platforms where both reliability and responsive performance are critical.

Overall, the proposed method demonstrates excellent robustness across high-noise and multi-task environments. It consistently outperforms a diverse set of competitors, including classical baselines (Decision Tree, Linear Regression) and modern SOTA methods (Graph Neural Networks, Reinforcement Learning), in both predictive

accuracy and deployment efficiency when handling complex, noisy data in decentralized platforms

#### 4.6. Ablation Study

To quantitatively validate the contribution of each key component in the framework, we conducted a systematic ablation study. In this experiment, we sequentially removed or replaced key modules, loss terms, and input modalities in the model, observing the changes in performance. Table 5 presents the results of the ablation study, reporting the performance changes after removing each component.

**Table 5.** Ablation Study Results

Component	Accuracy (%)	F1 Score	Inference Time (ms)	Performance Change
All Components (Baseline)	85.2 ± 1.3	0.82	100	-
Remove Feature Fusion Module	80.4 ± 1.5	0.78	100	Accuracy decreased
Remove Denoising Mechanism	81.7 ± 1.4	0.79	100	Stability decreased
Remove Incentive Mechanism Optimization Module	82.3 ± 1.3	0.80	120	Slower convergence
Remove All Modules	70.5 ± 2.1	0.68	130	Significant drop

In the ablation study, the removal of the feature fusion module and denoising mechanism led to significant drops in both accuracy and F1 score (down to 80.4% / 0.78 and 81.7% / 0.79, respectively), indicating the critical importance of these two modules in maintaining the model's predictive performance. The feature fusion module integrates multimodal data, ensuring that the model provides a complete representation of user behavior. Meanwhile, the denoising mechanism enhances the model's robustness by cleaning data noise.

When the incentive mechanism optimization module was removed, the accuracy and F1 score showed only a slight decrease (82.3% / 0.80), but the inference time increased to 120 ms, indicating that this module plays a crucial role in maintaining the computational efficiency of the model.

When multiple key components were removed, the performance degradation was more pronounced (e.g., when all modules were removed, the accuracy dropped to 70.5%), revealing the synergistic effects between the modules. The combination of the feature fusion and denoising mechanisms not only improved prediction accuracy but also enhanced the model's ability to handle complex noisy data. The incentive mechanism optimization module, in collaboration with the feature fusion module, helped ensure performance while improving overall computational efficiency.

## 5. Discussion

The DeFi credit evaluation and incentive mechanism optimization method proposed in this study has demonstrated outstanding performance in various

620 experimental scenarios, particularly in terms of accuracy, F1 score, and inference speed.  
621 It shows a significant improvement over baseline methods and the latest SOTA methods,  
622 especially in high-noise environments, exhibiting strong robustness. The performance  
623 improvements can mainly be attributed to the synergistic effects of the feature fusion  
624 module, denoising mechanism, and incentive mechanism optimization module. The  
625 feature fusion module effectively integrates multimodal data, enhancing the model's  
626 understanding of complex behavioral patterns. The denoising mechanism reduces noise  
627 interference, improving stability and robustness. The incentive mechanism optimization  
628 module dynamically adjusts incentive strategies, enhancing system stability and activity.  
629 Together, these three modules allow the model to better handle complex data in  
630 decentralized platforms, achieving higher prediction accuracy and computational  
631 efficiency.

632 However, the proposed method still has limitations. First, the model's performance  
633 is constrained by data quality, particularly when there are missing or anomalous values  
634 in the data, which impacts its predictive ability. Although the denoising mechanism has  
635 improved, data incompleteness remains a challenge. Second, while inference speed has  
636 improved compared to SOTA methods, computational overhead still needs optimization,  
637 especially with large-scale user data. Lastly, the design of the incentive mechanism leans  
638 towards static strategies, and future work could consider incorporating more dynamic  
639 factors to adapt to the complexity of decentralized finance environments.

640 The proposed method has broad application potential. DeFi platforms can utilize  
641 this method for accurate credit evaluation and dynamic incentive strategies, improving  
642 platform activity. Additionally, this method could be transferred to the traditional  
643 financial sector, providing efficient credit scoring and risk assessment. As blockchain  
644 technology develops, integrating smart contracts and automated decision systems will  
645 bring smarter financial services.

646 Future research can improve the current method in several ways. First, enhancing  
647 data quality control, especially addressing issues of data sparsity and missing  
648 information in decentralized platforms, could be combined with techniques such as  
649 GANs to enhance the data. Second, optimizing model inference efficiency through  
650 distributed computing or edge computing techniques can reduce computational  
651 resource consumption. The incentive mechanism optimization could introduce more  
652 dynamic adjustment factors based on real-time user behavior feedback to enhance  
653 system stability. Finally, exploring cross-domain technology integration could improve  
654 the model's performance in multimodal data processing.

655 Overall, while the proposed method has shown strong adaptability and potential in  
656 decentralized finance platforms, future research must further explore and optimize data  
657 processing, computational efficiency, and dynamic optimization strategies as data  
658 complexity and computational demands continue to grow.  
659

## 660 **6. Conclusion**

661 This study addresses the challenges of credit evaluation and incentive mechanism  
662 optimization in DeFi platforms by proposing a novel solution. By introducing the  
663 feature fusion module, denoising mechanism, and incentive mechanism optimization  
664 module, this study significantly enhances the accuracy of credit evaluation and platform  
665 stability. Experimental results show that the proposed method achieves an accuracy of  
666 85.2%, improving by approximately 2 percentage points over the best baseline method,  
667 while also enhancing inference speed by over 50%. This demonstrates that the model can  
668 effectively handle the complex data and incompleteness of DeFi platforms, achieving  
669 more efficient credit evaluation and incentive optimization.

670 The core innovation of this study lies in the proposed dynamic credit evaluation  
671 framework based on denoising mechanisms and feature fusion, which improves  
672 prediction accuracy and robustness. Additionally, a game theory-based incentive  
673 mechanism optimization model was designed to dynamically adjust incentive strategies,  
674 improving platform activity and system stability. Experimental results confirm that the  
675 proposed method offers significant advantages in handling sparse and noisy data in  
676 decentralized platforms, while also improving platform activity.

677 From an academic perspective, this study provides a new framework and method  
678 for credit evaluation and incentive mechanism optimization in the DeFi field, addressing  
679 the limitations of existing methods in high-noise and sparse data environments.  
680 Practically, the proposed method provides a feasible solution for DeFi platforms,  
681 especially in enhancing credit evaluation accuracy and platform stability, with potential  
682 for transfer to the traditional financial sector.

683 Despite achieving significant results, the proposed method still has limitations. First,  
684 data quality continues to impact model performance, and future work can integrate  
685 techniques like GANs to enhance data and improve robustness. Second, the design of  
686 the incentive mechanism could be further optimized, particularly by incorporating more  
687 dynamic factors in the complex decentralized financial environment. Lastly, with  
688 increasing data scale, inference efficiency still needs to be improved, and distributed or  
689 edge computing could provide effective solutions.

690 In the future, as decentralized finance platforms continue to evolve, the potential of  
691 the proposed method will be further explored. This method can also be applied to  
692 traditional finance fields, such as credit evaluation, risk prediction, and smart contract  
693 optimization. As technology advances, new algorithms and techniques, such as more  
694 efficient denoising methods and graph neural networks, will further drive the  
695 development of decentralized finance and smart financial services.

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699 Z.Y.; formal analysis, Z.Y.; investigation, Z.Y.; resources, Z.Y.; data curation, Z.Y.;  
700 writing—original draft preparation, Z.Y.; writing—review and editing, Z.Y.; visualization, Z.Y.;  
701 supervision, Z.Y.; project administration, Z.Y.; funding acquisition, Z.Y. The author has read and  
702 agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

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